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Abstract Mergers among housing associations have become a frequent phenomenon in
both the Netherlands and England. The general literature on mergers highlights the need
for research to consider the wider political and business environment, managerial motives
and strategic choices, to adopt a process perspective and to evaluate outcomes in relation to
competing definitions of goals and success criteria. This article applies these perspectives
to consider drivers for and experience of housing association mergers in the Netherlands
and England, competing motivations such as efficiency savings in relation to borrowing
and procurement costs, improved professionalism and organisational capacity and external
influence. We discuss the pace and motivations of mergers, the expected positive and
negative effects, and actual outcomes. We focus on the impact of mergers on stakeholder
satisfaction, housing production and operational costs. Based on our findings we discuss
the implications for policies and practice in both countries. Our main conclusion is that the
relationship between the size of housing associations and their performance is not
straightforward. This is partly because large and small associations are generally trying to
do different things in different ways and have contrasting strengths and weaknesses; thus
judgements about whether mergers and concentration of ownership in third sector housing
is a change for the better are dependent upon considerations of underlying purposes and
success criteria.
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1 Introduction
Mergers have become a key feature of the restructuring of third sector housing in both the
Netherlands and England. In the Netherlands the number of housing associations declined
by more than 50% and the average number of dwellings per organisation increased from
around 3,000 in 1997 to 5,600 in 2008. In England the average size of housing associations
doubled in the past 10 years. In both countries there has been a process of concentration of
ownership, which in some ways resembles the merger process in the private sector.
However, a key difference from the private sector is that third sector organisations are not
subject to ‘hostile takeovers’ since their shares are not traded on the market. Third sector
organisations have no shareholders that could coerce their management into a merger.
A similarity between the housing associations and the private sector is that mergers
frequently fail to deliver the promised results. Organisations often do not operate in a more
efficient, effective or more customer-focused manner after a merger. Still the process of
mergers in third sector housing is ongoing. So lacking shareholders and hostile take-overs
that could drive this concentration in the not-for-profit housing sector, what are the forces
underpinning this development and what are the impacts?
In this paper we want to explore the drivers and motivations for mergers among housing
associations and the impact of mergers and organisational scale on their performance. We
do this by presenting a preliminary analysis of the trends, patterns and implications of
housing associations mergers based on work that has been conducted in parallel so far by
researchers of third sector housing in England and the Netherlands. In Sect. 1 we discuss
some key themes in the research literature on mergers in general to consider the position of
mergers in third sector housing. Section 2 draws on research on the drivers, motives and
anticipated effects of mergers in the two countries. Then it reviews in some detail existing
and new evidence on outcomes of mergers in third sector housing, i.e. the impact on
service delivery, operating costs and housing production (Sect. 3). In Sect. 4 we discuss
possible explanations for unsuccessful mergers. In our conclusions (Sect. 5) we reflect on
the implications of our findings for policy in different contexts, contrasting the high levels
of policy steering in England with the much less regulated context in the Netherlands. We
then suggest a potential research agenda that might enable comparative research to stim-
ulate organisational and policy learning and promote change for the better in both
countries.
1.1 Methodological considerations
This is a first attempt to bring together evidence on a complex process of organisational
and sectoral change in two different housing systems with distinct legal and institutional
contexts; although there has been earlier comparative work on related topics such as
performance measurement (Walker and Van der Zon 2000). In the light of these differ-
ences, the findings are tentative and would benefit from further refinement in a comparative
research study with a common methodology. However, institutional variations and prob-
lems associated with differing administrative datasets and definitions would still constrain
comparison. Furthermore, since we are reliant mainly on interpreting findings from earlier
studies in each country, as is often the case with such systematic evidence reviews, dif-
ferences in findings may simply indicate the different research questions and methodolo-
gies adopted in the source studies. One small example of this is the emphasis in some of the
English literature on the process of merger and the implications of choices made at an early
stage in relation to strategic and cultural fit for long-term success (Jemison and Sitkin
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1986; Cowin and Moore 1996; Mullins 2000). This emphasis seems less prevalent in the
Dutch literature and it is therefore difficult to make direct comparisons without comparable
case study research. Nevertheless, it is apparent that similar questions are being asked
about the drivers, outcomes and policy implications of merger activity (Audit Commission
and Housing Corporation 2001; Davies et al. 2006; Van Veghel 1999; Cebeon, 2006). It is
useful to review these prior to making some recommendations for a future agenda to
accelerate learning through comparative research. In addition to published studies on
mergers cited in this paper, our research base includes an analysis of previously unpub-
lished performance data,1 interviews from a number of more general research projects2 and
engagement with senior managers.3
2 Mergers in third sector housing; learning from the wider research literature
Mergers are nothing new, neither among commercial enterprises nor within the third
sector. There is an extensive literature on the motives, process and outcomes of mergers in
the private sector (Hubbard 1999; Jemison and Sitkin 1986), a key message of which is the
high proportion of mergers that fail to increase shareholder value, partly as a result of the
limited consideration given to post-merger implementation planning. Recent attention has
been extended to mergers in the public and third sectors (Cornforth 1994; Cowin and
Moore 1996) and similar stories of variable success and focus apply. Mullins (1999, 2000)
has identified some relevant features of this literature for studying mergers in third sector
housing. Four main features may be summarised here. The first is the need to consider the
wider business and political environment in creating the climate for merger (Hubbard
1999). Private sector mergers tend to occur in waves reflecting disturbances or changes in
the external environment usually related to the economic cycle. Analysis later in this paper
shows similar patterns in the English housing association sector where policy and regu-
latory influences are strong drivers. The second is the need to consider managerial motives
and strategic choices that influence how organisations respond to changes in the operating
environment. For example, Singh (1971) argues that managers may be less interested in
profits than in growth since size of firm can have a major influence on their own rewards.
The consideration of managerial motives (Trautwein 1990) requires a critical approach to
the proposals that housing associations produce for mergers4 and a broad perspective on
organisational strategies including choices between different options (such as mergers,
alliances and groups; see next paragraph). The third is the process perspective (Jemison
and Sitkin 1986) which relates merger outcomes to decisions made at various stages of the
process, particularly at an early stage, on strategic and cultural ‘fit’; an over-emphasis on
the former often leads to poorly planned integration processes and sub-optimal outcomes.
Finally, there is a need to evaluate outcomes of mergers through close attention to the
1 KWH—results of quality measurements gathered over several years, based on quality labels developed by
KWH to assess landlord services, tenant and wider stakeholder involvement.
2 Delphi Panel study of English Housing Associations 1997–2004 (see Mullins 2006a for details, David
Mullins’ interviews with 20 Dutch HA directors 2007 (unpublished).
3 e.g. Mergers Masterclass at University of Birmingham December 2006, and work with National Housing
Federation members 2004/2005.
4 Since 2005 English associations applying to the regulator for approval of mergers have been required to
produce a business case setting out how the new structure will improve services, generate savings and how
these savings will be monitored (Housing Corporation Chair’s letter to HA board Chairs May 24, 2005).
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process and to the definitions of key success criteria (Cowin and Moore 1996) emerging
from organisations themselves and from their operating environment. Thus our research on
Dutch and English housing associations recognised that associations were often trying to
do different things in different ways, whereby simple distinctions between success and
failure are hard to make.
2.1 A continuum of choices
Returning to the question of strategic choice, Fig. 1 indicates that merger is just one on a
continuum of options, including partnerships, alliances, group structures and full mergers.
These options can all increase the scale of operations, but each has different implications
for control, independence and transaction costs. Partnerships and alliances preserve the
highest levels of independence for partner organisations but are difficult to control,
resulting in high transaction costs and continuing instability (since partners may pull out at
any time). Group structures are constitutional partnerships based on legal agreements but
were at one time thought to preserve significant opportunities for independence while
sharing central services and joint procurement. Mergers involve greater sacrifices of
independence and the possibility of enhanced control to deliver greater efficiencies (e.g.
through fuller functional integration and collapse of subsidiary governance) (Mullins and
Craig 2005). The recent story of sector restructuring in England has largely been one of
amalgamation through the group structure route, followed by fuller merger through
‘streamlining’ of governance and services delivery to create more integrated and unitary
organisations (Pawson 2006; Mullins and Pawson 2010).
An important development in both countries is the creation through a series of ‘mega-
mergers’ of a new set of third sector organisations operating on a much larger scale than ever
before. In both countries the largest associations now own and manage in excess of 50,000
homes. It has been suggested that ‘there is a real difference between managing an organi-
sation of 30,000 and one of 50,000 homes’, and that such organisations need new ‘structures,
methods, technology and mindsets’ to operate effectively (London and Quadrant 2006). The
emphasis on scale is somewhat ironic because housing associations in both England and the
Netherlands started in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century as small-scale and












Transaction Costs increase, 
Scale Economies decrease
Fig. 1 Mergers and alliance
options
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twentieth century English housing associations were seen to provide a smaller scale, an
alternative associated with ‘the rejection of mass models’ (Kendall 2003, p. 138).
The role of housing associations in England and the Netherlands has considerable
similarities. Both are now the main providers of social housing and often combine tradi-
tional landlord activities with social investments and community development. Dutch
housing associations are financially more affluent, less regulated and more hybrid by
combining third sector with commercial activities. Dutch housing associations are
monopolists in the social housing sector, while in England social housing is also provided
by local authorities which have much more of a ‘mixed economy’ of provision. In 2009
management of social housing in England was split into four almost equal shares: local
authorities direct management (24%), Arms Length Management Organisations managing
homes for local authorities (23%), traditional housing associations (27%), and stock
transfer housing associations (26%) (Pawson and Mullins 2010).
2.2 Change for the better?
One key policy question has featured prominently in both countries: do large organisations
perform any better than smaller ones and if so in what ways? This question has often been
reduced to technical considerations of efficiency and cost, with sophisticated analyses
attempting to compare costs of larger and smaller associations (CFV 2005; Indepen 2008).
However, it is sometimes recognised that larger and smaller associations may be trying to
do different things, and that their performance may therefore be very difficult to compare
in a meaningful way. Lupton and Davies (2005) have suggested that rather than consid-
ering economies of scale we might consider economies of scope. Economies of scope
consider the different scales at which activities (in contrast to the scale of the organisation)
such as housing management, development and back office services are ideally undertaken
(Chartered Institute of Housing (CIH) 2005). Moreover, Mullins (2006a) has suggested that
organisational logics associated with increasing scale for efficiency reasons may conflict
with logics concerned with promoting local accountability. Encouragingly large housing
associations in both countries appear to be taking this conflict seriously and have been
developing structural, cultural and governance solutions to the challenge to ‘think globally
but act locally’. For example, several larger Dutch associations have adopted structures
with locally accountable management units of around 5,000 homes. In England the
imperative to invest efficiency savings in service improvements has been stimulated by
regulatory requirements for merger proposals, by concepts of corporate social responsi-
bility and social return (Mullins and Nieboer 2008; Mullins and Sacranie 2009) and by
increasing emphasis by the social housing regulator (until 2008 the Housing Corporation,
now the Tenant Services Authority, TSA) on measuring social performance.
The pace of merger activity has been a highly visible and much discussed feature of
both the Dutch and English housing association sectors over recent years. Long-term trend
data for the two sectors indicates a similar direction of change, with high volumes of
merger activity and a resulting increasing average size of housing associations in both
countries (see Figs. 2, 3).
The different context for mergers in the two sectors is apparent from the available data.
For example the number of registered housing associations in England has remained fairly
constant since the sector has continued to grow through stock transfer. In direct contrast the
number of Dutch housing associations has decreased by nearly 50% over the past 10 years.
While the average size for all Dutch associations is more than 5,000 homes and the average
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English association is 1,420, the largest associations in the two sectors are of a more
comparable scale (50,000 England, 70,000 Netherlands).
Table 3 plots the time series of merger activity in England between 1976 and 2005. It
shows a continuous flow of ‘transfers of engagements’ (i.e. mergers) averaging about 1%
of the sector each year (Mullins 2000). Two peaks in activity reflected adjustments to
legislative and funding changes: namely the introduction of public funding post-1974–
1976; and the inauguration of the ‘mixed finance’ regime post-1988. In the later 1990s
there was a shift in the form of restructuring with the emergence of group structures of
associations and other charitable and non-charitable subsidiaries controlled by parent
bodies. Initially stimulated by corporation tax changes, establishment of group structures
was subsequently also motivated by other considerations including ring-fencing risky or
specialist activities and accommodating local stock transfer subsidiaries (Audit Commis-
sion and Housing Corporation 2001). A further and more intense process of sector
restructuring was triggered by 2004 reforms which concentrated development funding on
the 70 or so ‘best developing associations under the Housing Corporation’s Investment
Partnering procurement initiative’ (Mullins 2006b, p. 9).
In the eight years to 2009, stock holdings of the typical English housing association
grew by 50% (from 800 to 1,420 dwellings), while the proportion of national housing
association stock in the ownership of the 20 largest providers grew from 26 to 29%
(Pawson and Sosenko 2008). In England stock transfers from local authorities to housing
associations have had an important impact on the institutional landscape. Over 200 transfer
associations have been established, with stock holdings now exceeding those of the tra-
ditional housing association sector. Moreover, 40% of those set up as independent, stock
transfer associations have subsequently established or joined together with others to form
group structure arrangements. By 2007, over half of the transfer HAs operating as
subsidiaries (over a quarter of all transfer HAs) were members of groups which also
involved traditional (non-transfer) associations. (Pawson and Sosenko 2008). As a result,
over 75% of the stock managed by the largest 50 English associations is now managed by
groups including associations with origins in stock transfer from local authorities (Pawson
and Mullins 2010). To a lesser extent stock transfer is also a feature of restructuring in the
Netherlands where a White Paper in the early 1980s aimed to eliminate all municipal
housing companies by 1996. In practice there were still 213 in 1990, falling to 23 by 2000
(Ouwehand and Van Daalen 2002). Almost all Dutch municipal housing companies have
now been privatised into new independent housing associations or merged into existing
social landlords. Some of the largest associations such as Ymere, with a housing stock of
80,000 in the Amsterdam region, originated from the municipal sector.
2.3 Differences in policy context
There are significant differences in the policy context in which this restructuring activity
has been occurring in the two countries. Before the 1990s, Dutch housing associations were
largely controlled by the government through regulations and financial arrangements. In
the 1990s, however, the government diminished its direct financial support and replaced
the prescriptive regulations by the principle of retrospective accountability. This new
regulatory framework allowed the associations’ a lot more administrative freedom, but it
also meant a significant increase in their financial business risks (e.g. Gruis and Nieboer
2006). Consequently, housing associations have begun to adopt businesslike approaches in
their management (e.g. Gruis and Nieboer 2004; Gruis 2008). Mergers among housing
associations can be seen as part of this development and also as part of a wider trend of
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increased cooperation in various kinds of networks. Since the 1990s housing associations
have set up several types of cooperation aimed at, for example, joint product development,
treasury, finance and project development (including setting up project development
companies jointly owned by two or more housing associations).
English housing associations have also been subject to a degree of marketisation and
competition (Walker 2000). In particular, this has occurred through significant levels of
private borrowing and reductions in the proportion of scheme costs funded by government,
through cross-subsidies of rental housing from shared ownership and outright sales and a
resulting emphasis on businesslike behaviour and strategic management (Mullins and
Riseborough 2000; Mullins 2006a). However, English associations remain subject to
strong regulation. Two of the most important drivers of merger activity in the sector have
been regulatory intervention and a reduction in the number of investment partner associ-
ations directly funded by government (Mullins and Craig 2005). In England regulatory
intervention has been the main driver for enforced mergers, there being no market
mechanism for hostile take-overs. Enforced merger has long been the ultimate regulatory
sanction in the case of failing associations. The increasing regulatory burden has also been
a factor cited for merger, particularly by smaller associations (Mullins and Craig 2005). As
in the Netherlands, there have been alliances and network co-operation in areas such as
procurement and housing market renewal. Sacranie’s concept of multi-layered merging
captures the parallel processes of sectoral changes arising from blurring of state, market
and third sector identities alongside organisational mergers to create new kinds of
organisational cultures and governance models (Mullins and Sacranie 2008).
2.4 Merger drivers, motives and anticipated benefits
Researchers in both countries have attempted to establish why the trend towards increasing
merger activity has occurred. We have reviewed the extent to which these accounts
emphasise three main dimensions: external drivers inducing mergers as an organisational
response; internal motives such as growth and succession planning; and anticipated ben-
efits such as increasing professional expertise and ability to manage the regulatory burden.
A fourth consideration, varying in the attention given to it, is the need to appraise varying
options for achieving these anticipated benefits (e.g. the choice between alliance, group
structures and mergers and the level of integration desired within the merger option)
(Mullins and Craig 2005). Often such analyses combine these dimensions in a single set of
factors.
In 1998, Van Veghel conducted a survey among Dutch housing associations to inquire
about their motives for mergers (see Table 1). The three most frequent reasons for mergers
stated in that survey are achieving a better market position because of the larger size,
professionalisation and improving service delivery (Van Veghel 1999).
More recently, Cebeon (2006) conducted an in-depth analysis of the effects of mergers
among 15 housing associations that had merged before 1 January 2002. As part of this
analysis Cebeon asked what the objectives of the mergers were and whether the associa-
tions think the objectives have been achieved. In Table 2 we see that professionalisation
and market position due to the increased size are still the most frequently mentioned
objectives. Furthermore, these 15 housing associations seem to relate mergers more
explicitly to their (re)development tasks and risks. In contrast to English associations,
increasing efficiency is not a commonly stated motive for Dutch housing association
mergers.
360 G. van Bortel et al.
123
In England a similar survey was undertaken by Mullins and Craig (2005) to inform
responses of the National Housing Federation to an apparent acceleration in the pace and
scale of merger activity in the English housing association sector. This study identified a
continuum of merger and alliance options involving different trade-offs between inde-
pendence and scale with different levels of transaction costs involved (Fig. 1).
In the 1990s Group Structures had become the most popular method to increase
organisational scale. Group structures may be defined as formal associations of indepen-
dent organisations in which one organisation, the parent, has ultimate legal control over the
other ‘subsidiary’ organisations (Audit Commission and Housing Corporation 2001). One
of the factors favouring groups was the ability to preserve apparently independent
subsidiaries whilst benefiting from increased scale. After 2000 it became clear that inde-
pendence was limited by regulatory requirements for parents to have control (Housing
Corporation 2004) and later still increased emphasis on efficiency led to a move back to
mergers with simpler streamlined structures as the preferred model.
Table 1 Motives for mergers mentioned by Dutch housing associations
Motive n %
Better market position due to larger size 32 (76)
Professionalisation 31 (73)
Improving service delivery 28 (67)
Improving financial continuity 18 (41)
Better market position due to increased differentiation in housing stock 18 (43)
A more efficient back office 17 (40)
Matching investment tasks and means 10 (23)
Efficiency in restructuring neighbourhoods 10 (24)
Spreading risks of larger investment tasks 6 (14)
Other reasons 3 (8)
Total 42
Source: Van Veghel (1998)





Increasing size to become a stronger player in the (local) housing area 13 14
Make further professionalisation possible 12 15
Being able to conduct a large task (restructuring, new housing development) 11 13
Increasing size to be able to handle larger risks 11 11
Better local or regional co-ordination because of concentration of ownership 9 11
Expansion of activities (new competences within the organisation) 9 10
Efficiency gains 9 5
Matching tasks and means (of ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ housing associations) 6 7
Other objectives 2 4
Source: Cebeon (2006)
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Mullins and Craig (2005) also made a distinction between external drivers and internal
management motives and between the drivers for different types of partnership. Overall,
there was remarkable consistency of view that a Government-led efficiency agenda and
Investment Partnering had been the main drivers accounting for an increase in activity on
all areas of the continuum over the past two years. For individual associations, people
issues, especially the retirement of chief executives, was the main internal driver. Table 3
shows the most frequently mentioned drivers for each form of partnership.
3 Outcomes
3.1 Impacts of mergers
Assessments of the outcomes of mergers in the housing association sector have generally
been rather inconclusive to date. This is partly because different types of questions have
been asked, with a general tendency to seek evidence on financial benefits and cost savings
rather than on a rounded assessment of impacts on financial and social performance. It also
reflects a relative paucity of studies comparing the performance of different types and sizes
of housing organisations though see for example Walker and Murie (2004). In this section
we review existing evidence, but focus on new and emerging evidence highlighting the use
of benchmarking data in the Dutch context.
Table 3 Main drivers and motives for different forms of mergers and alliances: England 2005
Mergers
Value for money and efficiency agendas
Creating economies of scale and a more powerful entity with a greater ability to survive in a fast-paced
sector
Retirement of the chief executive
Expansion and growth—merger gives development potential
Investment partnering is now a driver for mergers




Mitigating risk: developing separate branches of specialism
Smaller associations feeling that they can’t keep up with the pace of change—ability to deliver part of
the package of joining a larger group.
Retirement of a chief executive
Regulatory intervention—‘the Corporation continues to see Groups as the best place for turning around
failing associations’
Other alliance/partnership
Investment partnering has been a major stimulus to alliances to secure continued access to development
funding
Efficiency and cheaper procurement were growing in importance as drivers for alliances and there had
been a ‘big push in repairs and maintenance partnerships’
Other alliances and partnerships are seen as the ‘third option’ for associations who don’t want to merge
or join a group structure
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In England, an early study of group structures (Audit Commission and Housing Cor-
poration 2001) was unable to find conclusive evidence of cost savings apart from those
associated with corporation tax or procurement. However, it did express concerns that
residents were being excluded from representation on the parent boards of the emerging
groups. Later work by Lupton and Davies (2005) found that no general conclusions could
be drawn about the correlation between scale and performance. They suggested instead that
a focus on the desired social and other effects and on effective management is more
important than the excessive emphasis currently placed on scale and structures. Most
importantly they suggested that there is no such thing as ‘one size fits all’ for housing
associations because different housing functions work best at different scales. This inter-
esting finding is discussed further in our conclusion.
Later work by Davies et al. (2006) was critical of the ambition of associations when
setting cost savings targets in their merger proposals (these were generally 1–2% of
turnover or 1.5–3% of operating costs). In the view of Davies et al., more ambitious targets
would have been appropriate and achievable. However, unpublished discussions by the
present authors with experienced practitioners suggest that they sometimes felt it was
better to ‘aim low and overachieve’. This alternative view was influenced by the unan-
ticipated costs frequently associated with mergers and by the increasing scrutiny of
whether promised benefits were being delivered.5 Davies et al. also found that over half of
the associations were failing to measure whether such savings targets were actually met,
but recognised that ‘measurement is inherently difficult given the dynamic nature of the
business’. Their analysis of published performance indicators for 2005 suggested that
groups had achieved savings in operating costs compared to other associations, but that
outcomes on most other indicators such as relet times, repairs performance and tenant
satisfaction were worse.
These studies appeared to influence the mood of organisational leaders involved in a
Delphi panel study undertaken by one of the authors (Mullins 2006a). This study found
that, paradoxically, most leaders expected a continued increase in merger and group
structure activity, but few expected that such activity would result in cost savings for the
associations involved. More recently, there has been a ramping up of regulatory expec-
tations in relation to efficiency savings, close scrutiny of proposals (also referred to as
‘business cases’) submitted to support merger applications and more concerted attempts to
monitor their achievement (signalled by a letter to all housing association chairs from the
then Housing Corporation Chair, Peter Dixon in May 2005). It is possible that as a result of
these changes clearer evidence will begin to emerge of such savings being delivered. For
example, one of the authors is involved in a long-term evaluation of a major amalgamation
of two large English groups to form an association of 50,000 homes. This organisation had
set an initial savings target of £2 million for central services and a similar amount for a
sub-group merger. It has adopted a balanced scorecard evaluation framework encom-
passing customer services, growth, influence and financial strength objectives. Later in this
section we will explore new evidence emerging from the operating cost index concerning
the impact of organisational scale on operating costs which suggests the emergence of a
scale effect after 2005 (Indepen 2008).
In the Netherlands, the Central Housing Fund (CFV, Centraal Fonds Volkshuisvesting)
has researched the subject from a primarily financial perspective (CFV 2005, 2006, 2007).
5 These discussions took place during a ‘Mergers Masterclass’ held at the University of Birmingham in
December 2007, attended by the directors of several English associations and facilitated by two of the
authors of this paper.
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The Housing Ministry (VROM) commissioned Cebeon (Centrum voor Beleidsonderste-
unend Onderzoek) to investigate the effect of mergers on social performance (Cebeon
2006). Cebeon’s study focused on the qualitative effects of mergers, such as local per-
formance agreements, regional and local commitment, effects on tenants, liveability,
product differentiation, investment power, management costs and efficiency. The study
concluded that mergers have a positive effect on the social performance of associations. An
overview of those positive results has already been given in Table 2. Drawing mainly from
Cebeon’s report (2006), we can also mention the following potential (interrelated) negative
effects:
• losing touch with (or giving less attention to) local governments, housing markets and
neighbourhoods, particularly when mergers expand the distribution of the housing
stock over multiple municipalities;
• becoming too strong in comparison to other associations and local stakeholders
(monopolisation);
• becoming less accessible to (local) stakeholders due to the larger size (particularly
when combined with a centralised decision-making structure) and due to the internal
orientation during the first years after the merger;
• a lower level of service delivery due to decreased accessibility to individual clients;
• less efficiency due to a larger overhead and increased internal bureaucracy.
Data derived from the annual reports of housing associations and from interviews with
association representatives give a picture of their results. But comparable data on how
tenants and other stakeholders perceive the performance of associations is still scarce and
fragmented. No similar data is available on the English social housing sector. Customer
and stakeholder satisfaction assessments by the Dutch Kwaliteitcentrum Woningcorpora-
ties Huursector (KWH) indicate that mergers lead to a period of introspection, reflected in
lower customer satisfaction scores immediately after a merger. The results fall in the first
year but then rise sharply and even exceed the pre-merger level. Larger associations take
longer to recover (see Fig. 4).
Total Housing  associations 
with more than 10,000 
dwellings 
Housing  associations 
with less than 10,000 
dwellings 
Number of years after merger  







Fig. 4 Average KWH-Huurlabel scores in the post-merger period. Source: KWH 2007
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3.2 Scale and the production of rented homes
Apart from ratings by customers and stakeholders, the production of new homes is one of
the main performance indicators for housing associations. In its sector survey for 2007, the
CFV reports that, after reaching a record low in 2001, associations doubled their pro-
duction of new rented homes to 24,700 units in 2006 (CFV 2007). However, the CFV also
observes that, year on year, actual production is far below the associations’ own forecasts,
which were twice as high. Housing associations forecast 60,000 new rented homes in 2008,
while the CFV—based on actual production in previous years—estimates that the annual
production of rented homes will stabilise at around 30,000 units.
The extent to which associations contribute to new housing varies from association to
association. For several years, the Housing Ministry (VROM) has published indexes
showing the best-performing associations in terms of construction, sale and demolition.
If we look at the size of associations, it is the largest organisations that build, sell and
demolish the greatest number of units. In 2006, the 56 associations with more than 10,000
units built 16,900 homes. The other associations built 7,700 units. In other words, the 12%
largest associations built 69% of the new association-funded homes in the Netherlands. But
the performance of large associations is less impressive when expressed as a percentage of
units owned. With the exception of the 3 mega-associations with more than 50,000 homes,
providers of rented social housing build between 30,000 and 50,000 homes—almost as
many as the associations with less than 1,500 homes (see Fig. 5).
As noted earlier, English government funding for constructing new social and afford-
able housing has been focused on 74 large investment partners. Recently published data
(Inside Housing, June 20, 2008) has confirmed that larger associations dominate the league
table of new building. Of the top ten developers in 2008, none had fewer than 18,000
homes in management already; only two had fewer than 30,000 units and five already had
more than 50,000 homes in management. Similarly it is mainly the larger associations that











































Fig. 5 New housing production, sales and demolitions in 2006 in percentage of the housing stock of
individual housing associations. Source: VROM 2006, adapation by authors
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would predict that similar conclusions could be generated about the general performance of
larger and smaller English housing associations—that they do different things and have
different strengths. Larger, more professional staffs improve compliance with corporate
measures of performance, while greater financial capacity and asset strength contribute to
higher new building activity and more construction for sale. However, on the down side
merger processes can lead to dips in performance. Larger organisations can find it harder to
achieve very high levels of customer satisfaction unless they are able to compensate for the
loss of personalised relationships and trust that smaller landlords can engender.
3.3 Scale and operation costs
In addition to the societal outcomes, efficiency is also an important indicator for measuring
the effects of expansion. Based on operating costs, it is difficult to defend the argument that
expansion leads to increased efficiency. The study of the operating costs of associations
(CFV 2005) shows that expenditure by large associations is considerably higher than that
by small associations (Fig. 6).
Figure 7 shows that larger Dutch associations have higher operating costs. Mergers thus
have less influence on cost levels. But this is not the full explanation. Why do large
associations have higher operating costs? It would be easy, but perhaps not inaccurate, to
attribute those costs to expensive head offices, high executive salaries and an excess of
managers and corporate staff. Relatively speaking, large associations do indeed employ
more people. In 2003, the associations with more than 4,000 units employed 10 FTEs for












2000 2001 2002 2003
1. Merged housing associations < 10,000
2. Merged housing associations >= 10,000
3. All housing associations < 10,000
4. All housing associations >=10,000
Fig. 6 Operating costs per dwelling (in euros). Source: CFV, survey of operating costs of housing
associations, 2005 (adaptations by authors). Note: the sharp increase in operating costs per dwelling in 2002
was due to the fact that two large associations formed a provision for restructuring in that year
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25% fewer staff (CFV 2005). Part of the extra staffing capacity is allocated to property-
development activities.
In its sector survey for 2006, the CFV reports that larger associations are better able to
deliver their planned production of new dwellings. Nevertheless, a direct correlation
between higher new production and higher net operating costs is not self-evident. Staffing
costs relating to project development are usually absorbed in the all-in construction costs of
the homes and therefore should not influence net operating costs. It appears that large
associations carry out extra activities that cannot be absorbed in the all-in construction
costs. We find indications of this in the follow-up study of operational costs published by
the CFV in 2006. The study showed that associations with high operating costs have a
higher ratio of staff to housing units. However, other operating costs have a greater
influence, particularly the higher expenditure on accountants, external consultancy, mar-
keting and communication, and liveability (e.g. investments in the public realm, social
inclusion activities). The study concludes that the remuneration of top-level management
does not contribute to the difference in operating costs. In its study, the CFV asked
associations to break down their costs by activity. The responses showed that associations
with high operating costs allocate a larger share of their wage costs to activities relating to
social management and liveability.
In England as well, new evidence is emerging in relation to operating costs. This
suggests that economies of scale are beginning to play a larger part in explaining variations
in operating costs of English associations, particularly for traditional (i.e. non-stock
transfer) associations.
In England a slightly different approach has been taken to calculating the operating cost
efficiency of housing associations with more that 1,000 homes6 in management and
excluding ‘specialist’ associations (those with greater than 50% of housing for older
people, supported and specialist housing). The Operating Cost Index (OCI) was introduced
in 2004 and its methodology was amended in 2007 to enable ‘meaningful comparisons
between the operating costs of RSLs’ (Housing Corporation 2007). It is presented as a tool
for self-improvement to help associations understand their cost base and drivers in com-
parison to other associations.
Barriers to success
PROCESS





Fear loss of identity
Strategic mismatch










Lack of focus on outcomes
Fig. 7 Process issues and
outcomes England
6 This threshold was introduced in 2007 and then applied to re-analysis of 2005 and 2006 data.
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The index uses data provided by associations in annual and quarterly returns to
‘investigate the significance of various cost drivers, and only includes cost drivers that are
found to be statistically significant and which are found to explain the majority of operating
costs of RSLs’ (these included the number of social and non-social housing units, house
type mix, decent homes requirements and trends in costs versus inflation over time). Data
has now been collected for three years and results for 2007 use a new method of calcu-
lation: actual cost as % of predicted cost. This is a far truer reflection of an index (a result
of less than 100% suggests costs below that predicted, the converse being true for costs
greater than 100%).
The analysis (by Indepen Consultancy 2008) has consistently distinguished between
operating costs of stock transfer and traditional associations. It shows different patterns for
calculations with and without major repairs expenditure.
The first publication of results coincided with work by Lupton and Davies (2005) on
mergers and scale, asking ‘is bigger better’? They reported that ‘an analysis of the OCI
based on size found no strong evidence of economies or diseconomies of scale. If we
consider the mean average performance (including major repairs) broken down by size, it
shows that associations with less than 5,000 units have a higher average ranking than larger
ones, but that the ranking of those between 5,001 and 7,000 is noticeably lower than the
largest associations. If major repairs are excluded there are no clear differences based on
size’.
The analysis by Indepen (2008) (using a new methodology and confining the analysis to
associations with 1,000 or more homes) draws a rather different conclusion. ‘There is
evidence of economies of scale for English traditional associations on both measures of
costs (including and excluding major repairs)’. For stock transfers there were scale
economies if major repairs were excluded but not if they were included. ‘Economies of
scale had not been observed previously’.
Within its complex overall methodology, the Indepen study takes a relatively simple
first step, comparing the number of social housing units to net operating costs. Using this
simple coefficient alone they find that for traditional associations ‘for every 10% increase
in social housing units, net operating costs increase by 9.2%, indicating economies of
scale’ (p. 22). For stock transfers the same coefficient indicates that ‘for every 10%
increase in social housing units net operating costs increase by 9.8%, with no evidence of
economies of scale’ (p. 26).
This suggests to the outside non-technical observer that either the changed definitions
had induced these new results or there had been an increased emphasis on delivering
efficiencies in larger associations. The latter is evidenced by harder merger business case
savings submitted to the Housing Corporation and the trend to streamline group structures
to strip out bureaucratic and governance costs. Further possible explanations of patterns in
the data suggested by Indepen include accounting treatment, timing and scale of major
repairs, quality of outputs, and cost drivers not covered by the model.
4 Unsuccessful mergers
The literature on mergers indicates the importance of considering not just the motivations
and external drivers but also the processes involved in brokering, negotiating and imple-
menting mergers. Jemison and Sitkin (1986) argue that ‘the acquisition process itself is a
potentially important determinant of acquisition activities and outcomes’ (p. 145). An
important critique of much merger activity in the private sector, accounting for the rather
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limited success rate, is the emphasis on ‘strategic fit’ at the expense of ‘organisational or
cultural fit’ (Porter 1987; Datta 1991). Strategic fit refers to the mutual goals and ambitions
of the organisations prior to merger. The organisational and cultural fit are connected with
the structure, systems, skills, management style, staff characteristics and shared values of
the organisations that must be implemented after a merger to enable successful delivery of
outcomes. This emphasis has also been found in the English housing association sector by
Mullins (2000; see also Mullins and Craig 2005), who identified the typical stages of a
merger process and noted that most guidance and attention had been given to strategic fit
and pre-merger planning (e.g. National Housing Federation 1999).
Studies of critical success factors for mergers in both third sector (Cowin and Moore
1996) and profit-distributing sectors (Hubbard 1999) indicate that the most important stage
of the process is after the deal has been done. Failure to plan for post-merger integration,
inadequate consideration of organisational cultures and values of the partner organisations,
and failure to keep the key stakeholders (staff, boards and customers) informed and
involved in the change process are some of the most common causes of failed mergers.
Mullins and Craig (2005) explored the success rates of merger proposals. From expert
interviews they estimated that 25–33% of proposed mergers fell by the wayside at various
stages after their initiation. The main factors leading to abortive mergers were perceived
differences in organisational cultures and failure to agree on who would be the Chair and
Chief Executive of the new organisation. Following the business literature, which suggests
that a high proportion of commercial mergers fail to deliver shareholder value, Mullins and
Craig also explored some reasons why housing association mergers that proceed may not
succeed. Again, culture was a major factor, together with post-merger integration issues
such as planning, communication and staff buy-in.
Evidence of the reasons for mergers not proceeding is also available for the Nether-
lands, where Van Veghel (1999) asked housing association actors to indicate why a merger
had not taken place in cases where mergers had been negotiated. As Table 4 shows, the
most frequent reasons are related to differences in organisational cultures and company
targets and the reluctance to give up the independence. It is interesting to note that cus-
tomer factors such as tenant resistance and increased distance from clients were not
mentioned by most respondents.
Table 4 Motives for not going through with a merger mentioned by Dutch housing associations
Motive n %
Board of supervisors and/or director did not agree 29 (48)
The culture of the organisations was too different 28 (47)
The association did not want to lose its independence 15 (25)
The company objectives were too different 12 (19)
Resistance among employees 8 (14)
The organisation of the companies was too different 8 (13)
The distance to the clients would become too big 3 (5)
Resistance among tenants 2 (3)
Other reasons 11 (18)
Total 42
Source: Van Veghel (1998)
Making sense of housing association mergers 369
123
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have explored the motives and outcomes of mergers in the Dutch and
English housing association sectors. In both countries, mergers take place with a wide
range of motivations, among which the desire to be able to create more output in terms of
lettings, housing development and the variety of services seem common factors in both
countries. The main distinctions we draw from the review of merger drivers evidence is the
greater importance attributed to external drivers in the English context, reflecting the
strength of regulator pressure. This is associated with the greater importance attached to
efficiency than to factors such as market position and professionalisation, which drive the
merger process in the more market-based Dutch context. Evidence on merger outcomes
suggests that larger housing associations produce relatively more new homes, seem to be
more capable of cooperation with societal partner organisations and offer a wider variety of
services. Smaller housing associations perform relatively well in terms of service delivery
and tenant participation (as appreciated by tenants). The evidence presented in this paper
also suggests that smaller associations have relatively low operating costs, although the
evidence from England is less conclusive. Our paper has also drawn attention to the
importance of post-merger integration planning to merger success, noting the belated
recognition of this by good practice guidance for the English third sector housing sector. It
has shown the importance of cultural factors as barriers to the merger process and success
in both countries, supporting the case for a greater balance between cultural fit and stra-
tegic fit in merger planning. Finally it has highlighted the greater recent attention to post-
merger evaluation in the English context primarily in relation to regulatory drivers. In
conclusion we would like to highlight some implications for policy and for strategic
choices between a continuum of merger and alliance options. We also suggest some
directions for future comparative research.
5.1 Policy implications
A key consideration in debating policy implications regards the different levers that are
available to influence the policy directions we have observed.
In the Netherlands mergers have been seen as a response to freedom from state direction
and the adoption of more businesslike behaviour by associations. Approval by the Housing
Ministry is still required for mergers to proceed. Yet this is often a rather technical matter
and there is little direct or indirect pressure by either CFV or VROM to make mergers
happen. Dutch local authorities have relatively limited leverage over merger activity. They
do exert influence on planning matters, regeneration schemes, and rent increases for higher
quality properties, all of which may drive merger activity in certain situations.
In England the Housing Corporation had long declared its reluctance to intervene in the
shape and structure of the sector. However over a long period regulatory intervention has
been an important merger driver for failing associations. The regulatory burden (particu-
larly arising from the inspection regime introduced in 2002) has been reported as a motive
for merger even amongst associations not facing immediate regulatory intervention
(Mullins and Craig 2005). Furthermore, since 2004 there has been an increasing steering of
merger objectives as a result of the requirement to submit business cases to secure regu-
latory approval for mergers. The requirement to demonstrate clear customer benefits and
efficiency savings has led to more focused proposals and to more streamlined structures
capable of generating significant cost reductions.
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A final significant difference from the Dutch context is the ability to use public
expenditure levers to influence organisational behaviour. Here, the most significant impact
has come from the investment partnering regime. From 2004 on, it has limited the number
of associations in direct receipt of a social housing grant, thereby encouraging other
associations with development aspirations to merge or form alliances with the directly
funded associations.
An underlying policy issue that is easily ignored is that in neither country are mergers in
the third sector subject to the prospect of hostile takeovers, as found in the share trading
parts of the private sector. This factor is significant, since it limits the ability of predatory
or expansionist associations to realise acquisition targets. Moreover, it enables associations
that may not be exploiting their assets to their full potential to continue to do so without the
threat of external takeover.
5.2 Scale, function and the continuum of partnership options
Our main empirical conclusion is that the relationship between the size of housing asso-
ciations and their performance is far from straightforward. This is principally because large
and small associations are generally trying to do different things in different ways and have
contrasting strengths and weaknesses. As we have seen in the Netherlands, smaller asso-
ciations have more satisfied customers and tenant representatives, as well as lower oper-
ating costs. However, many small associations do not build new homes. The measurements
for the KWH-Maatschappijlabel show that large associations are more effective in terms of
relations with stakeholders and translating social expectations into business processes. In
England larger associations have greater capacity to manage regulator compliance, and the
regulation system itself has been a major driver of the trend toward increasing scale.
These findings clearly complicate judgements on whether the process of increasing
scale and industry concentration through merger is a change for the better. Different
organisations are trying to do different things, and some commentators have suggested that
the optimum size may vary between activities. In England, Lupton and Davies (2005) have
suggested that ‘one size does not fit all’ since different sizes are appropriate to different
functions (Table 5).
The statements about size range are tentative and must be considered in the English
context, in which housing associations manage fewer homes on average than associations
in the Netherlands. However, it is clear that there is a minimum ideal size for activities
such as property development, back-office, finance and improvements. By contrast, general
housing management (e.g. rental and maintenance) have a maximum ideal size, above
which the organisation becomes too distant from its customers. This differentiation is
reflected in the attempts being made by many associations to find the best organisational
Table 5 Optimal size range for the activities of UK housing associations
Output Optimal size range
Housing management and maintenance 1,000–5,000 homes
Improvement and renovation More than 5,000 homes
Project development More than 7,000 homes
Full range of financial skills More than 5,000 homes
Full range of back-office services More than 10,000 homes
Source: Lupton and Davies, Chartered Institute of Housing (CIH) 2005
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structure, in cooperation with others or within their own organisation. They suggest a shift
of focus from economies of scale to economies of scope. This relates to the added value for
customers and stakeholders, and to finding the most appropriate organisational form (e.g.
strategic alliance, joint venture or partnership geared to a specific service, business process,
project or district).
In our earlier discussion of forms of merger and alliance (see Fig. 1) we identified a
continuum of options with different combinations of scale, independence and transaction
costs (Mullins and Craig 2005). One response to Lupton and Davies’ (2005) conclusions on
economies of scope would be to draw greater attention to alliances of independent or-
ganisations rather than to groups or fully integrated mergers. However, this option could
involve higher transaction costs and difficulties in maintaining relationships as circum-
stances change.
5.3 Future research directions
This paper has provided the opportunity to exchange information and ideas about the
meaning and trajectory of merger behaviour in two contrasting settings. While the research
reported upon has explored similar themes, there have inevitably been difficulties in
‘joining up’ and comparing studies undertaken with different methods and purposes.
However, from these studies we believe there is scope for further comparative work on
housing association mergers in England and the Netherlands and would make the following
suggestions.
Recent detailed analysis of sector restructuring in England (Pawson and Sosenko 2008)
was not matched by any of the sources we located in the Netherlands. It would be useful to
develop a similarly detailed descriptive account of the two sectors.
Work by KWH in the Netherlands provides a far more comprehensive picture of merger
outcomes and the comparative performance of large and small associations across a broad
field of performance goals than is currently available at aggregate level for English
associations. It would be useful to harness benchmarking data to replicate such analyses
and add to the rather ambiguous evidence emerging from the operating cost index studies
(Indepen 2008).
Further work on the merger process seems critical given the findings of writers such as
Jemison and Sitkin (1986) that early emphasis on strategic fit at the expense of cultural fit
can plant the seeds of long-term adverse performance outcomes. Furthermore, it is
important for this work to place emphasis on all stages of the process, including post-
merger integration stages, where studies have again indicated that the seeds of failure are
often harvested (Hubbard 1999). This approach is most likely to be achieved through case
studies covering the life cycle of mergers and taking into account the impacts on a range of
corporate aims and from the perspective of a variety of stakeholders. However, detailed
case studies of the merger process and its outcomes are costly to undertake, are much less
common and difficult to replicate. We believe, however, that studies taking into account
multiple stakeholder and life cycle perspectives on organisational changes are most likely
to generate knowledge that is of value in understanding and influencing these processes.
Given the differences in policy context and sector position clarified in this paper it
would not be practical to attempt a controlled experiment comparison between case study
organisations in the two countries. However, there would seem to be scope for a looser
alliance of housing organisations and researchers interested in horizontal learning and
involved in discrete long-term evaluations to share ideas on questions such as:
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• managing the tensions between scale and local accountability;
• developing new models to manage and measure social performance in large
associations;
• developing organisational structures that enable large associations to be ‘better
neighbours’ to local communities.
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